Musharraf bows to the inevitable.
Of all world leaders Musharraf was the one who Bush left in the most impossible position. Shortly after 9-11 Powell flew to Pakistan to demand that Musharraf dedicate his government to the removal of al Qaeda, a policy which was unpopular amongst his army and amongst huge swathes of his population.
And, in the intervening years, Musharraf has walked a tightrope, doing just enough to keep Bush satisfied - or, if not satisfied, at least not utterly dissatisfied - and trying not to upset the militant groups within his own country; a task at which he was obviously less successful judging from the amount of assassination attempts on his life.
But, in the end, his attempt to dedicate the Pakistan government to the US cause has become impossible to sustain, the wolves have surrounded him, and Musharraf has bowed to the inevitable and resigned.
Of course, his firing of the Chief Justice and the declaring of a state of emergency all contributed to Musharraf's downfall, but I do wonder what now for the Bush administration's policy regarding Pakistan. And I do wonder what now for this dysfunctional coalition in Pakistan now that they have removed Musharraf, an objective that has often appeared to be the only thing which united them.Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, bowed to massive domestic and international pressure to quit yesterday in a move that could further destabilise the volatile country if the coalition government fails to hold together now that their common enemy is removed.
A grim-faced Musharraf delivered an impassioned defence of his record on live television that lasted for over an hour. He kept the news of his resignation until the final moment, ending his almost nine years in power with "God bless Pakistan".
"If I was doing this just for myself, I might have chosen a different course but I put Pakistan first, as always," said the president, wearing a western suit and tie but speaking in the national language, Urdu.
The coalition government, led by the Pakistan People's party and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-N, had managed to stage a bloodless counter-coup by announcing two weeks ago that they planned to impeach the president.
Most members of the coalition government, which came to power after elections in February, did not want to go through the trauma of impeachment proceedings, hoping the threat of prosecution would be enough to convince the president to go. That strategy proved successful just two hours before parliament was due to meet to officially start the prosecution process.
It will be impossible to succeed in Afghanistan without the co-operation of the Pakistan government, and any new Pakistani coalition must be aware that it was Musharraf's policy of supporting the US which, in part, led to his downfall.
The alliance he had accepted with the United States after the attacks of 9/11 boiled down, in the eyes of many, to an acceptance of something akin to client status. Each reported US raid in the tribal areas against Taliban or al-Qa'ida forces was a new illustration of Pakistan's compromised sovereignty. It was not their President's ambition that people could not forgive, but what they saw as the demeaning of Pakistan.
The presidential broadcast he made after 9/11, explaining to his fellow countrymen why they were now to be allied to the United States in its "war on terror" was masterly. But it was also agonising to watch him visibly wrestling with what were clearly conflicting demands of domestic and external security. It was as though he knew that he was sowing the seeds of his eventual defeat; that he was risking not only his political, but his physical survival.
This was a degree of risk that no other member of George Bush's "coalition of the willing" was required to take.
It is perhaps just as well that Bush's time in office is drawing to a close and that an incoming US president is perhaps going to have different objectives in the region than those Bush demanded from Musharraf.
Because the pressures of fighting the war on terror, and a campaign against the Taliban, who were previously (and some would say still are) supported by the ISI made his position simply untenable.
It's actually to Musharraf's credit that he lasted as long as he did. For the Bush regime, whilst badgering on about democracy, asked him to carry out a policy to which huge swathes of his populace were opposed.
I have always said that Bush did not have a Pakistan policy but, rather, he had a Musharraf policy. With Musharraf's departure, the failure of Bush's inability to look beyond him is about to become glaringly apparent.
Administration officials will now have to find allies within the fractious civilian government, which has so far shown scant interest in taking on militants from the Taliban and Al Qaeda who have roosted in Pakistan’s badlands along the border with Afghanistan.
At the same time, suspicions between the American and Pakistani intelligence agencies and their militaries are deepening, and relations between the countries are at their lowest point since Mr. Musharraf pledged to ally Pakistan with the United States after the 9/11 attacks.
One of the first tasks of the incoming president will be to form a new relationship with Pakistan's fractured coalition government. That's not a task I envy him.
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