The Osterley Times: Revealed: the first draft of dossier that took Britain to war

For three years the government have attempted to stop us ever seeing the first draft of the infamous "dodgy dossier" because, to do so, would allow us to see for ourselves whether or not the document had been "sexed up" as Doctor David Kelly claimed:

Fresh evidence that the Iraq weapons dossier was "sexed up" emerged as the Government finally published the secret first draft of the document.

As expected, the earliest version of the document did not include the now notorious claim that Saddam Hussein could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order to do so.

The first draft made a series of lurid claims about the extent and danger of the Iraqi president's weapons arsenal. But those were expressed in even stronger terms by September 2002, when the official dossier on which Tony Blair based the case for war was published.

There are many of us who, after listening in great detail to the Hutton Inquiry, came away convinced that the final document had been "sexed up" and that it had been done so at the request of Alastair Campbell. Indeed, Campbell only got away with this because of Hutton's rather convoluted reading of the phrase "sexed up" and the fact that Gilligan made a slip in the first of his transmissions and implied that knowingly false evidence was inserted into the report.

From the Hutton Inquiry:

The term "sexed-up" is a slang expression, the meaning of which lacks clarity in the context of the discussion of the dossier. It is capable of two different meanings. It could mean that the dossier was embellished with items of intelligence known or believed to be false or unreliable to make the case against Saddam Hussein stronger, or it could mean that whilst the intelligence contained in the dossier was believed to be reliable, the dossier was drafted in such a way as to make the case against Saddam Hussein as strong as the intelligence contained in it permitted. If the term is used in this latter sense, then because of the drafting suggestions made by 10 Downing Street for the purpose of making a strong case against Saddam Hussein, it could be said that the Government "sexed-up" the dossier. However in the context of the broadcasts in which the "sexing-up" allegation was reported and having regard to the other allegations reported in those broadcasts I consider that the allegation was unfounded as it would have been understood by those who heard the broadcasts to mean that the dossier had been embellished with intelligence known or believed to be false or unreliable, which was not the case.

Now, I would apply the phrase "sexed up" as it refers to Hutton's second definition of the phrase, in that the government were making a case for war and designing the document for that purpose by including only the most contentious evidence they had against Saddam and ignoring any dissenting opinions or any contrary points of view. To this end all caveats were removed and suspicions were presented as facts. Indeed, even Hutton concedes that - were that the argument being made - "it could be said that the Government "sexed-up" the dossier." Only by developing a different reading of the phrase "sexed up" was Hutton able to exonerate Campbell.

The first draft now shows that this document was not the result of some dry assessment of the intelligence community, it was a political document aimed at advancing war. And, once this document was passed to the intelligence community, it's language was made stronger at the behest of Alastair Campbell.

Last night, the opposition parties said the language used by Mr Williams, the former political editor of the Daily Mirror, showed that ministers initially turned to senior press officers to make eye-catching claims about the evils of Saddam's regime. They renewed calls for a public inquiry into the build-up to the conflict.

William Hague, the shadow Foreign Secretary, said: "This is yet further evidence that spin doctors, not intelligence analysts, were leading from the first in deciding what the British people were told about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction."

Ed Davey, the Liberal Democrat foreign affairs spokesman, said: "The Government cannot continue to deny the major role that spin doctors played in creating this dossier."

David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, said the Government had not released the draft earlier because of concerns that officials could be deterred from offering frank advice if they feared it could be made public.

And, if you believe Miliband, then you really will believe anything.

The truth is that there was an astonishing amount of political interference in this document and Blair's claim at the time - "There was no attempt, at any time, by any official, or minister, or member of 10 Downing Street staff, to override the intelligence judgments of the JIC. That includes the judgment about the so-called 45 minutes." - was simply false. Although, I note that, with a typically Blair flourish he covers his back by stating that no attempt was made to "override" the intelligence community. He would no doubt argue that "toughening up" the language is not "overriding" it.

For the evidence of Campbell doing just that is everywhere:

On Sept 9 the JIC circulated a regular, secret assessment containing a new piece of intelligence from an MI6 agent-in-place in the Iraqi army "indicating" that Iraq was capable of deploying chemical and biological weapons (CBW) ready for firing within 45 minutes. The information was not regarded as deserving of inclusion in the "key points" of the assessment, but rapidly took on a life of its own.

Although Mr Scarlett was in charge, he was offered the "presentational" expertise of Mr Campbell. Curiously, given Mr Scarlett's ascendancy, Mr Campbell chaired a meeting on the dossier in his office on the 9th.

Pregnant with menace, the 45-minute point had been noticed at an early stage by Mr Campbell, a seasoned journalist. Even before the completion of the final draft of the dossier, he had included it in a foreword to be signed off by the Prime Minister.

During the inquiry, Mr Campbell explained: "I started a draft based upon what the Prime Minister wanted to say. And certainly that was one of the points that he felt was worth covering."

"Forty-five minutes" would go on to be mentioned four times in the published dossier, but not in its original qualified form. By the final draft it was a certainty that the Iraqis could deploy CBW in that time. The Prime Minister also referred to it in his address to the Commons on Sept 25, the day after publication.

Campbell highlighted the 45 minute claim because - by his own admission - he knew that's what editors would run with.

And, while they were pushing this claim, they also weren't telling us that this was based on hearsay.

This was no dry intelligence assessment, as Blair and others have always claimed. The first draft, and all that occurred later, confirms that this was a pitch, a selling point, to take this country into a needless war.

The more we discover about this whole tacky business, the more our initial suspicions are confirmed.

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