The Osterley Times: Hubris: the new Iraq war syndrome

This essay from David Owen received much discussion in yesterday's Sunday morning programmes. Thought it might be of interest:

The hubristic posture has been described by philosopher David E Cooper as 'excessive self-confidence, an "up yours!" attitude to authority, pre-emptive dismissal of warnings and advice, taking oneself as a model'.

The centralising natures of George W Bush and Tony Blair were such that they were both in search of more power and were, therefore, particularly susceptible to being swept up with the intoxication of power, following the tragic events of September 2001.

This was modern hubris, described by sociologist Daniel Bell as 'the refusal to accept limits, the insistence on continually reaching out. The modern world proposes a destiny that is always beyond: beyond morality, beyond tragedy, beyond culture'.

Bush and Blair began 'trying to create a new legal regime' for avoiding the constraints of international and national law on interrogation and detention after their military intervention in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. They planned to build a new paradigm to replace the Geneva conventions that were not allowed to apply to al-Qaeda or Taliban prisoners, and they tried to do all this by themselves, with little or no consultation with friends or allies.

There have been incompetent heads of government in the past who have shown no signs of hubris and have often lacked self-confidence. But there is an acknowledged association between hubris and incompetence in Iraq mentioned by a number of serious commentators. The restless energy of hubris that constantly intervenes often does so without all the factual information; the excessive self-confidence that does not seek advice or fails to listen to the wisdom of others makes serious mistakes; and the inattention to detail and focus on the broad brush all combine to associate hubris with incompetence and poor judgment.

In addition to having this tendency towards incompetence, Bush and Blair share strong religious beliefs and an inner certainty that they are men of destiny. Unusually, perhaps because he knew he was committed to stepping down as Prime Minister before another general election, on TV on 4 March this year, Blair abandoned his reservations on talking about his religion in public and, in relation to Iraq, said: 'If you have faith about these things, then you realise that judgment is made by other people. If you believe in God, it's made by God as well.'

What we have the right to demand of our leaders, particularly when contemplating going to war, is rational, factual weighing of the risks, and the benefits, before resorting to military force. Holy wars breed arrogance, ignite hubris and are followed all too often by nemesis.

There is a public scepticism about bringing religion into questions of peace or war, just as there is a dislike of narcissism and egotism from civilian leaders when it is members of the armed forces who are risking their lives.

Following 9/11, the language and rhetoric of both Blair and Bush began to have the ring of zealotry; nuance and qualification became rarer, certainty and simplicity ever more dominant.

It is important for those who believe in the decisive leadership of representative democracies to analyse the nature of Blair and Bush's incompetent leadership and its links to hubris. They did not lack courage in deciding to invade Iraq. What they lacked were the skills and attention to detail to plan for all the possible scenarios that would face the military they ordered into battle.

I am not attracted to conspiracy theories. I supported the invasion of Iraq and I do believe, in contrast to many of their critics, that Bush and Blair did think gas and chemical weapons could be found inside Iraq in 2003, as did the intelligence services of France, Russia and Israel. They did genuinely fear that these weapons might be used, as gas had been previously used against Iran. They also dreaded the eventual development of Iraqi nuclear weapons.

Yet they did not seal the Iraqi borders with Syria and Iran after the invasion, even though the opportunism of al-Qaeda meant their involvement in Iraq was totally predictable. They did not plan for exactly what would replace the authority of Saddam Hussein. Nor did they think through the consequences of disbanding the Iraqi army. Why? Excessive self-confidence convinced them that the troops would be welcomed with open arms and they were dismissive of the genuine concerns of advisers.

For Bush on 1 May 2003 to fly on to the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln off the coast of California with the control tower emblazoned with 'Mission Accomplished' to celebrate victory in Iraq was hubris of a very high order.

Blair never went so far, but his early rhetoric was also far too triumphant. Even when the insurgency developed, neither man was ready to admit error and authorise the extra troops needed. As a key US official in Baghdad said: 'Hubris and ideology ruled.' Competently handled, the US/UK invasion of Iraq could have laid the foundation for a unified democratic Iraq. Incompetently handled, it has led to a civil war and possibly partition.

Tony Blair's judgments covering Afghanistan and Iraq showed signs of being not only erroneous, but unstable and unstructured. On 14 July 2006 ,the Financial Times ran an article entitled 'Hubris is the thread running through Blair's many travails'. After his handling of the Lebanon crisis, nemesis struck. Blair was told by Labour MPs that they were no longer ready to let him stay as Prime Minister beyond June 2007 and many wanted him gone before then.

The most common criticism of Blair has been that he was Bush's poodle and simply went along with the Bush administration at all times. Common it may be, but it is not the right criticism. Blair actually agreed with Bush on most of the decisions which are now seen to be wrong. What we have witnessed should be a solemn warning. The intoxication of power in heads of government can be as great a menace to the quality of their leadership as are conventional illnesses.

· This is an edited version of an essay, 'Hubris and Nemesis in Heads of Government', published in November's Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine. For full version, see www.jrsm.org.